The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce\u27s Semiotic Theory by West, William W.
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Master's Theses 
1977 
The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory 
William W. West 
University of Rhode Island 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
West, William W., "The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory" (1977). Open Access 
Master's Theses. Paper 1559. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/1559 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
THE OBJECT OF SIGNS IN 
CHARLES S. PEIRCE'S SEMIOTIC THEORY 
OF 
WILLIAM W. WEST 
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 
PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
1977 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 
. . • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . • • • 
Page 
1 
I THE CATEGORIES • . . . . . . . . . .. . •· .... 




The First Trichotomy: 
Qualisign • • • • • 
The Sign Itself . ~ • • 
• • • • • •• • • • • • 
15 
15 
Sinsign • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 
Legisign. • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 17 
The Second Trichotomy: The Sign-Object 
Relation ••••• . • ....... . • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Icon. 
Index • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 





The Third Trichotomy: Ho~ the Interpretant 
Represents th~ Object • • • • • • • • • 32 
Rheme • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Dicisign. 
Argument. 
• • • • 
• • • • 
. . .. 
• • • 
• • • • • • • • 




Dynamical Objects, Immediate Objects, ~·:-·~·-;c::'. :' 
Dynamical Interpretants, Immediate 
Interpretants, Final Interpretants. • • 35 
Immediate Object, Dynamical Object. • • 35 
Immediate, Dynamical and Final 
Interpretant •••••••••• • • 
WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF A SIGN?. 
i 






CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 61 




This thesis attempts an explanation of the object 
of signs in Charles s. Peirce's semiotic theory. In this 
r~gard it tries to defend Peirce's ~iew that every sign 
has an object. The question of the conventionality of 
signs is also taken up in the investigation of Peirce's 
classification of signs. In this regard the thesis attempts 
to argue, contrary to Peirce, that anything requires a 
convention if it is to be significative. 
In chapter I Peirce's categories are introduced 
and explained in order to provide the necessary background 
for the later explanation of his classificatory scheme. 
In chapter II Peirce's original three classification 
trichotomies are discussed in order to develop the main 
lines of the triadic sign relation and Peirce's sign ·theory 
in ~eneral. In this chapter it is argued that Peirce•~ 
classification scheme breaks down at certain points and 
. le ·ads to a blurring of . . some of the distinctions between 
signs. On this point the question of conventions in sign 
theory arises. The thesis argues that a convention is 
required for all signs whereas Peirce seems to think that · 
only symbols require a convention. An explanation of the 
immediate-dynamical object distinction and the immediate-
iii 
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dyµamical-final interpretant distin .ction is also attempted 
in this chapter. 
In chapter ~II the question of the object of signs 
is taken up in some detail. Here it is ~rgued that every 
sign ha~ an object when it is actually functioning as a 
sign. In this regard much emphasis is put on the role of 
context in determining the object of a given sign. The :; 
distinction between the immediate and dynamical object is 
developed in greater detail and it is suggested that this 
distinction might be helpful in deciding whether or not 
Peirce thought ali things are signs. 
In the conclusion a summary o.f the arguments for 
the necessity of a convention for all ~igns and the 
intentionality of all signs is given and some other 
questions in sign theory are suggested. 
A bibliography is appended to the end of the thesis. 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis deals with Charles s. Peirce's semiotic 
theory~ with concentration on the questions of the conven-
.tionali ty and intentionality of signs. Do all Signs 
require conventions . and do all signs refer to an object? 
It will be my contention that all signs do require a 
convention in order to signify and that all signs do refer 
to an object. In this regard, it wili .be helpful to explain 
what I mean by a convention and what I mean by "refer to". 
I would explain the idea of convention . in terms of 
decision and designation. A convention is a decision on 
. . . . 
the part of some intelligience to de~ignate or accept one 
thing as a ·sign ·of some other thing. This convention may 
be public or private, shared or not shared; but in any case 
it . is required in the makin~ •Of a si~n, and before any 
particular sign can signify for any particular individual, 
that individual must be aware of the convention which is 
necessary in making that sign a sign. If we were to phrase 
this ih more traditional terms, we might say a convention 
is an agreement, compact or contr .act ~ of an intelligience 
with itself to regard such and such as a sign of such and 
such. 
By the power to "refer to", I mean the power of a 
1 
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sigri to direct attention or thought toward something. 
Signs always point t ·o something. This thing is .its object. 
It is my contention that just as thought is always thought 
of something, a sign is always a sign of something. __ 
I have used Douglas Greenlee's Peirce's Concept of 
Sign as a major secondary source and foil to Peirce's 
theory, since his is the only comprehensive study of Peirce's 
semiotic dealing with these issues. 
My hope is that this thesis will succeed in marking 
out the essential features of a sign and stimulate thought 
on the many other issues in semiotic theory. 
Note: All references to Peirce's writings refer to the 
Collected Papers (Cambri~ge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1960.). Volume.s I-VI are edited 
by · Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Volumes VII-VIII are 
edited by Arthur w. Burks. The references are usually 
indicated within parentheses"()". The number before the ~-
decimal point indicates the volume number and the number 
after the decimal point indicates the paragraph _number. 
For instance (2.236) .would indicate volume II, paragraph 
236 of the Collected Papers. The squared off brackets 
"[] "sometimes found in the course of guotes from Peirce 
in this thesis indicate words added either by the editors 
.. 
of the Collected Papers or by the writer of this thesLs. 
To distinguish the ~ource of the brackets, initials are 
found immediately after the bracketed words. "[ J " H. W. 
indicates a bracket inserted by Hartshorne and Weiss. 
"[ J II A.B. indicates a bracket inserted by Arthur Burks. · 
· 
11 
[] " W. w. indicates a bracket inserted by the writer of 
this thesis. 
3 
Chapter · I 
THE CATEGORIES 
Like all detailed studies of Charle~ s. Peirce's 
semiotic theory~ this one will start with an account of his 
all _pervasive triadic~ categorial scheme. Peirce, in an 
article subtitled "The author's response to the anticipated 
suspicion that he attactes a superstitious or fanciful 
importance to the number three, and forces divisions to a 
Procrustian bed of trichotomy", defends himself from the 
accusation that he suffers from a mental disorder that might 
be called tri~domany. (1.570) Peirce feels that the triadic 
division of being as well as the further numerous triadic 
classifications and subdivisions of various subjects is 
necessary and unavoidable. This is just the way things 
are, and the three categories are exhaustive of . rea _lity. 
Since Peirce applies these 6ategorie; to virtually every 
area of his philosophy, both as a device of ontological 
· division and as a tool of analysis, it is a prerequisite 
of any study of Peirce to have ·a working knowledge of these 
three catefories. What then, are these three categories? 
They are named quite unassumingly firstness, . secondness 
and thirdness. 
Firstness is described by Peirce in various places 
as mere possibility (1.304) or anything describable with-
4 
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out contradictions or unanalyzed immediate feeling (1.310). 
Qualities are the denizens of this category. 
But I (Peirce) mean the qualities themselves which, 
in themselves, are mere maybes, not necessarily 
realized •••• That mere quality, or suchness~ is not 
in itself an occurence, as seeing a red object~s •••• 
Its only being consists in the fact that there might be 
such a peculiar, positive, suchness in a phaneron. 
When I say it is a quality I do not mean that it inheres 
in a subject. (1.304) 
Firstness then, is pure possibility or quality or unanalyzed 
feeling. · Peirce gives the example of a man just awaking 
from sleep and experiencing the undifferentiated blanket of 
qualities in that split second before he assigns each 
quality to a subject and structures the room. At that 
moment he is disoriented, and all there is is a myriad of 
undifferentiated qualities or the qualities themselves. 
(8.346) 6 But "a quality or feeling can be imagined without 
any occurance ••• its mere maybeing gets along without 
any realization at all". (1.304) 
Secondness is the category of hecceity or thisne~s, 
of spat~o-temporal objects or events; It is what "happens 
to be"; whatever is real, in th~ sense of having the 
character of brute force. "Generally speaking genuine 
secondness consists in one thing acting upon another -
brute action." Secondness, then, is the category of dyadic 
relations and here and now brute existence • 
. Thirdness is the category of wou.ld-bes. That is, 
it is not about "what actually occurs, but of what would, 
in the long run, occur tinder certain circumstances". (6.328) 
The category of thirdness contains laws, habits of nature, 
or generals. These are the laws or habits that guide the 
relations of secondness. 
6 
Now .what would-be can, it is true, only be learned 
through observation of what happens to be; but never-
theless no collection of happenings can constit~te one 
trillionth of one percent of what might be, and would 
be under supposable conditions. (6.328) · · 
Although Peirce generally associates universals 
with generals, there are passages which indicate that 
perhaps they should be kept separate (5.343, 2.324)~ and 
the examples Peirce gives of universals (redness, qualities, 
relations etc.) indicate that ~niversals are might-bes or 
firstnesses and generals as laws about what would-bes are 
thirdnesses. On this interpretation universals need not 
be instantiat~d since they are possibles, whereas generals 
must be instantiated in order to have being - or truly be 
said to be what they are. Peirce says that a true general 
cannot have any being unless there is some prospect of it 
being embodied in a fact, which, of course, is not a law. 
(1.304) 
·. The three categories might be briefly identified as 
follows. Firstness is the category of possibility. 
Secondness the cat .ego:t,y of brute actuality. Thirdness is 
the category of law or generality. In various places Peirce 
make~ it clear that FJrstness and Thirdness are not to be 
considered lifeless things merely because they do not have 
the mode of' existence or Hecceity. (3.460, 2.222, .6.455, 
1.26, 5.453 et al) I make this point in order that as we 
later investigate the question of the bbject of ~igns, we 
keep in mind that we needn't look solely to the category 
of secondness or actuality. Signs will often refer to 
things .of firstness and thirdness. It is also possible 
that signs will point to purely fictive objects. 
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The above should give an adequate -picture of Peirce's 
categories and should render Peirce's semiotic division 
somewhat more intelligible. · One more point should be made 
before we attempt an explanation of Peiroe's · semiotio. 
That point concerns Peirce's use of the categories. Peirce 
seems to use his categories in two ways. One way is as a 
basis of division according to the mode of being of some~ 
thing. The other way is as a tool of analysis to identify 
certain characteristics, features or factors of a given 
subject matter. Douglas ·Greenlee calls these the hypostatic . 
and factorial versions . of the categorie~, respectively. 
And I think that this distinction of Greenl~e's is worth-
~bile to bear in mind. Greenlee may make more of this 
distinction than is warranted, since he feels that Peirce 
himself was not fully aware of it and so was led to some 
confusion by it. This is an issue I will take up later. 
For now I think it is enough to note that there is something 
of this sort going on. 
Chapter II 
SIGNS EXPLAINED 
After spending some time trying to understand 
Peirce's semiotic theory one becomes aware of certain 
problems. Peirce's work with signs was pioneering _work. 
Much of his classification was tentative and experimental. 
This often .manifested itself in a continual changing and 
rearranging of the names and classes _ of various signs. 
Fo~ insiance, as late as 1908 in a letter to Lady Welby we 
find Peirce asking if she can "suggest a really good name" 
for a "possible" sign, which Peirce had already alternately 
named on previous occasions a "tone" a "tynge" a "mark" . , , , 
a "potisign" and a "qualisign". Sometimes Peirce would 
make a distinction, for example, between a representamen 
and a sign, and then later all but ignore the distinction 
and use the words interchangeably. When Peirce originally 
began his analysis of Signs, he orily distinguished the _sign, 
the object, and the interpretant and so was led to only 
ten classes of signs. Later, however, Peirce further dis-
tinguished two diffterent types of objects and three differ-
ent types of interpretants. This led him to suppose that 
there wer~ possibly 59 1-049 classes of signs. He did not 
think there were actually this many, but he did think there 
were 59,049 very difficult questions to consider as to 
8 
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whi-ch ones would be actual classes. Peirce usually assumed 
this number could be reduced to 66 classes, but . is never 
sure of this. And of these 66, only a handful were 
examin~d in any detail. If one adds to these pro~lems 
the fact that his sign theory is scattered throughout his 
writings in various papers and fragments and the fact that 
it is nowhere brought together in one work, it is clear 
that the task of determining just exactly what Peirce meant 
.to say on a given aspect of semiotic theory is by no .means 
easy. One should also not be surprised to find some contra-
dictions among Peirce's writings. This is the impression 
one is left with as the study first begins, but upon deeper 
analysis some of the seeming contradictions begin to re-
solve · themselves. I ~tress the word some, since not all 
can be resolved and some seem unresolvable • . All this is 
only by way of demonstrating the complexity of Peirce's 
work in the field of semiotics. T.he complexity of semiotic 
theory itself, perhaps, goes much deeper. 
One of the problems this thesis will attempt to 
deal with is the problem of reference of signs. In this -
regard an important point to bear in mind is this: signs 
are rarely, if ever, used in isol~tion. In ~ther words, 
signs are virtually always set in a context of other signs 
or in the context of a given situation, which situation 
itself becomes a sign of how a given sign is to be inter-
preted. The object of a given sign cari therefore change 
depending on ·the sign's context. For example, any de-
·. 
· 10 
monstrative pronoun certainly has its . object contextually 
determined. But, for instance, the word "ground" and the 
word "arms" each has its own separate object if considered 
individually, but taken together they form a command i.e. 
f'Ground arms!", which has its own object. Taking them indi-
vidually does not seem to capture exactly _ what the object 
. of each is in this context. 
Another feature of signs which may cause some 
problems is the way in which their classification may. ~hange 
depending on the perspective of the classifi~r. For instance, 
a footprint in the sand on a desert island could be classed 
as an index, since it has real relation to its object which 
is in this case the man who made it; or it could be classed 
as an icon since it bears a resemblance to at least a part 
of a man. This type of elusiveness of signs in their 
character and meaning may caus~ some confusion in trying 
to interpret Peirce unless we keep in mind that an analysis _ 
of signs can only consider one perspective at a time. There-
for ·e it is helpful to view Peirce's examples from the per-
spective that Peirce is using at the time, since pur~ 
examples of hi4 classes are seldom available. With these 
considerations in mind, I'll proceed with an explication of 
Peirce's sign theory. 
Pei~ce defines a sign many times in his Collected 
Papers. (1.339, 1.438, 2.228, 2.274, 2.303, 4,531, 6.347, 
8.177, 8.179, et.al.) A typical definition of a sign is 
as follows. 
1 1 
A sign, or representamen/ is a first which stands 
in such a genuine triadic relation to a second, called 
its object, as to be capable of determining a third 
called its interpretant to asswne the same triadic 
re1ation to its object in which it stands itself to 
the same object. (2.274) 
Another definition of a sign is as: 
••• anything which determines something else 1 · . 
(its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself 
refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant 
becoming in turn a . sign and so on ad infinitum. (2.JOJ) 
Andr another definition is made as follows: 
••• anY:thing . which being determined by an object 
determines an interpretation to determination, through 
it by the same object ••• every sign is determined 
by its object, either first by partaking in the 
characters of the object, when I call the sign an iconJ ; 
secondly by being really and in its individual existence 
connected with the indiviual object, when I call the ~ 
~i&D.~P~index; thirdly by more or less approximate 
certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the 
object, inconsequence of a habit (which term I use as 
including a natural disposition), when I call the sign 
a symbol. (4.531) 
The slgn relation is an irreducubly triadic relation 
and is therefore relegated to the cat~gory of thirdn~ss. 
Why then does Peirce make a definition of si~s in terms of 
firsts, seconds and thirds? · The answer is that while i the .: 
mode of being of the sign relation is that of thirdness, in 
analyzing the . sign relation the three factors of the sign 
relation are firsts, seconds, and thirds in respect to each 
other, as Peirce points out: 
••• the first, the second and the third are all 
three of the nature of thirds, or thought while in 
respect to one another they are first, second and third. 
The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; 
that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague 
idea. The second · is thought playing the role of' second-
'1c:,~1.-iness; or eve;nt. That i~ it is of' the general nature of · 
· experience or information. The third is thought in its 
role of governing secondness. ·. It brings the information 
12 
into the mind, or determines the idea r.md gives it body. 
It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away 
the psychological or accidental human element, and in 
this genuine thirdness we see the operation of a sign. 
(1.537) 
The sign itself is called a first in relatton to 
the object and interpretant because the sign as uninterpreted 
is capable of a number of possible interpretations and 
possibility is, as we have already shown the predomineQt 
characteristic of firstness. The object is secondnesa 
since it is the part of the sign relation which causally 
(using causally loosely) determines the sign and mediately 
the interpretant. As for the interpretant, Greenlee feels 
it is to be seen as a third because interpr~tation always 
involves interpretation which is general. But he then admits 
that such an explanation is not without problems since, as 
he correctly points out, Peirce allows for interpretants ., 
which are particular rather than general. But it may be 
better to view t:he interpretant in terms of a habit or law · 
of interpretation. That is a habit 9f interpreting the sign -
in a certain way on the part of the interpreter. Thus the 
problem of a particular interpretant (such as at a given 
command -performing a particular action) can be avoided by 
viewing this as an instantiation of a general habit. 
So the sign has a character of possibility awaiting 
interpretation. The object has the charcter of actuality 
in that it is the causally ·determini.ng ractor in the sign 
relation. And the interpretant has the charcter of gen-
erality either as interpreting thought or as instantiated 
13 
habit. But it must be remembered that this is just an 
analysis of th~ triadic relation using the categories as a 
means for bringing out the prominent features of the · 
genuinely and irreducibly triadic sign relation, which pro-
perly belongs to the category of thirdness. · It should also 
be remembered that the sign vehicle, the object, and inter-
p~etant~ themselves may have a mode of being in any of the 
categories. For instance, a sign may be an actual sign or 
second as any actual written or spoken sign is, or a general 
as the sign is without instantiation. This distinction is 
the type-token distinction. That is, as Peirce puts it: 
There ~ill be ordinarily about tw~nty "the's" on a 
page, and of course they count as twenty words. In 
an .other sense · of the word "word", however, . there is but 
one word "the" in the English language; and it is im-
possibl~ · that this word sh6uld lie visibly on a page 
or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not 
a si~gle thing or single event. It does not exist. · · 
It only determines things that do . exist. Such a de-
::~;- ; finitely significant form, I propose to term a type. 
A single event which happens once and whose identity 
is limited to that one happening or a single object 
or thing which is in some single place at any one instant 
of time, such event or thing being significant only as 
occurring just when and where it ' does such as this or 
that word on .a single page of a single copy of a book, 
.r will venture to call a token~ (4.537) · 
An object, too, as mentioned earlier may be of any 
of the three modes of being. For instance an object may be 
a specific individual person such as Napolean or a ' general 
thing sudh as mankind. An interpretarit may be an action 
such as a soidier's actual grounding of arms upon the com-
mand to "Ground arms!", or it may be a general thought or 
idea such as the concept of the act of giving. The sign 
relation, then, is a third with its constituents capabl~ 
14 
of analysis in terms of first, second and thirds. 
The sign relation also involves an infinite series 
of interpretants. Since each interpretant is itself~ sign, 
it must have its own lnterpretant and so on ad infinitum. 
The infinite regress (or progress, depending on your per-
spective) seems to present some problems. Does this mean 
a sign is never fully interpreted, or that once a sign is 
interpreted must it continue to be interpreted in infinite 
succession? Briefly, the answer is no to both questions. 
Peirce points 6ut that "if the series is broken off, the :: 
sign~ insofar, falls short of the perfect signifi~ant char-
acter. · It is not necessary that the interpretant should 
. actually exist. A being in future ~ill suffice." (2.92) 
So the way to avoid the problem::i of an infinite series is 
po describe the series as a potential rather than an actual 
one. In other words, every sign has a power to determine 
an interpretant and _ that interpretant, once determined, be-
comes a sign which also has a power to determine a future 
interpretant. I will have more to say on this "power" to 
determine interpretants when we get into the se~tion on 
interpretants. 
Having said this much by way of general explanation 
of Peirce's definition of and theory of signs, I propose to 
take each member of the tri~dic relation and investi~ate it 
separately. Peirce has made three divisions of trichotomies 
of signs. The first is based on how the sign is in itself. 
The second is made ~ccording to the relation of the sign . to 
its object and the third is made according to how the 
interpretant represents the sign. An investigation of 
those three trichotomies, then, should yield some under-
standing of the three constituents of the sign relation. 
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The first will tell us about the sign itself, the second 
will tell us about the object and the third will tell us 
about the interpretant. As mentioned earlier, Peirce later 
outlined ten trichotomies after he developed a distinction 
between an immediate object and a dynamical object, and a 
distinction between an immediate, dynamical and final inter-
pretant. The analysis of tthe bther seven trichotomies was 
barely even started, but the new distinctions among objects 
and interpretants are important to an understanding of 
Peirce. I will take up the explanation of these distinctions 
after an explanation of the three trichotomies. 
The First Trichotomy; The Sign Itself 
Peirce explains the first trichotomy as follows: 
"According to the first division a sign may be termed ,,'.a ::' 
qualisign, a sinsign, or a legisign." (2.244) 
Qualisign: "A qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It 
cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied, but the 
embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign." 
(2.244) An example of this type of sign would perhaps be 
the quality red which has come to indicate danger in various 
mediums. The quality red may -be a sign to stop if its used 
in~ a traffic light or it may in~icate danger as is some-
times the case with certain pieces of medical equipment. 
The sign itself is a _quality. Of course there are no pure 
qualisigns since qualities taken universally are only pos-
sibles. Any embodiment of a quality necessarily makes it 
no longer a possible. But the point is that it is the qual-
ity, not the actual embodiment of the quality, which is 
called the . sign and this gives it its character of a qual-
isign. 
Sinsign: A sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as 
meaning "being only once•, as in single, simple, Latin 
semel etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which 
is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; 
so it involves a qualisign or rather, several quali-
signs. (2.245) 
' Sinsigns are similar to tokens in one respect, that is, all 
tokens are sinsigris in that they are the actual here and 
now written or spoken word. For that matter the example of 
the red light is a sinsign in any instance that it is ~c 
actualized. However, it is not quite clear that every sin-
sign is a token since in this trichotomy the basis of dis- · 
tinction seems to be the character of the sign which makes 
it significant. So just as it was the possible quality red, 
as opposed to any particular actualization of red which 
gave the red light its significative power, one might argue 
that a sign should not be put in the class of sinsigns merely 
because of its being an actual here and now sign (as any :, 
actual instance of a written or spoken word.is), but rather 
a sign should be classes as a ~insign only if it is a single 
or uniquely different event which is significant. This type 
of event would presumably be of the nature of an omen or 
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some natural event that is a sign. In other words it is 
the eve~t itself rather than the event .of the instantiltion 
of a general sign which gives the sign (which could pro-
~erly be put in the category o~ sinsigns) its character 
as a sign. Tf this analysis is correct then the identifi-
cation of a sinsign and token which Peirce seems to make 
later may be improper. Peirce, however, does not seem to 
make this confusion in the section from 2.24j - 2.246 where 
he develops this trichotomy, as he says in 2.246, "The re-
plica is a sinsign •••• But these are not ordinary sin~ 
signs, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded 
as significant." 
Legisign: · A legisign is a law that is a sign. This law 
is usually established by men. Every conventional 
sign is a legisign but not conversely. It is not 
a single object, btit a general type which it has been 
agreed shall be significant. _ Every legisign signifies 
through an instance of its application, which may be 
termed a replica of it ••• the replica (would not be) 
significant if it were not for the law which renders 
. it s O. ( 2. 246) 
A legisign, then, is a type. That is, it is a word or sign 
taken generally, . The word "bird" is not anywhere written 
or spoken . but it is a general type which . we agree will be 
significative whenever it is actually written or spoken. 
A legisign, according to Peirce, is not alwaya a convention-
al sign • . For instance, a symptom of a disease is a natural 
sign of that particular disease. This symptom, if taken 
generally, would be a 1egisign or type, i.e. the symptom is 
not any pa·rticular instance of' the symptom in a particular 
person, but the symptom in general. But, there is some 
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question on this point. Greenlee thinks th~t not only all 
legisigns require a convention, but also tha ·t all signs 
require a convention. 7 That is, every sign requires a 
convention by which the sign . is made significa ti ve. I 
think that Greenlee is right on this point. However full 
discussion of it is more properly left to the second tri-
chotomy of signs. 1 raise it here b~cause we should not 
take it as granted that not all signs requir~ a convention. 
In closing our di~cussion of this section it is im-
portant to note that we class the sign itself according to 
the characteristic ~of a sign which makes it significative, 
That is,the signification may be due to a possible quality 
(qualisign) or an actual existent or e~ent (sinsign) or a 
general law {l~~iiign). But neither a qualisign or a 
legisign can actually function as a sign unless they are' 
em·bodied in an a.ctual sign or sinsign. And a sinsign re-
~uir&s qualisigns or qualities in order to acquire a dis-
tinctive character and so function as a sinsign. So although 
each has a prominent characteristic whi_ch serves as the 
characteristic of division, they require the characteristics 
of each trichotomy in order to actually function as a sign. 
The . Second Trichotomy: The Sign-Object Relation 
Peirce felt that this trichotomy was the most im-
portant. This is the one he most often refers to when :,, ,,,, 
making a brief explanation · of sign theory. The main reason 
for emphasis on this trichotomy can be found in the .'"'fact 
that he considered his work ori signs to be foundational to 
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logic. And logic ia concerned with the relation of a pro-
position to it~ object or wheth~r or not the proposition 
represents its object correctly. 
Icon: At any rate, according to the second tricho~~my a 
sign -may be termed an icon, index, or a symbol. Peirce says 
that _ the ·111con , is ... a .,..sign which refers to the object it de-
notes merely by virtue of characters of its own." (2.247) 
It is impbrtant ~to note here that the basi~ of div-
ision for this trichotomy is the relation of sign to object. 
In the case of an icon the relation is one of resemblance. 
That is, it is the qualities posessed by the sign which 
are the same or similar (either substantively or structurally) 
to those of the object, which make it ~epresentative of the 
object. It is the similarity to the object which makes it 
fit to function as~ sign of tha~ object. The sign has 
these characteristics or qualities independently of the 
object. Obvious examples of iconic signs are maps, paint- · 
ings, and photbgraphs. Peirce says that the sign "stands ., 
for that object, not in all respects, but in refer~nce to 
a sort of idea, which I hav~ sometimes called the ground of 
the representamen." (2.228) The ground is an idea or pure 
absrtaction from th~ object in question. It is . the relevant 
aspects br package of aspects of the object to which the 
sigh refers. For example the sign, "John is big" refers 
to John but only in respect to the abstract idea of the 
l;>igness. But the ground of a sign can be taken in an even 
larger sense. In 2.228 Peirce goes on to explain what he 
. : . 
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consid~rs the ground to be. ·The sign: 
stands for that object, not in all respects, but 
in reference to a sort of idea ••• "Idea" is here 
to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very 
familiar in everyday talk; I mean in the sense in which 
we say that one man catches another man's idea _ ••• " 
In 1.551 Peirce speaks of the ground in terms of a pure 
abstraction. In this sense the ground, for instance, of 
bhe sign "bird" would be the abstract idea of a bird or the 
package of relevant aspects which a bird posesses. And when 
the word "bird" is used to stand for a particular bird, it 
stands for it not in all respects but in respect of this 
ground. Although this example does not apply directly to 
icons since "bird" is not an icon, it does illustrate the 
idea of the ground of signs. The ground is that aspect of 
the object which is represented to the interpreter by the 
sign. 
With this in mind, Greenlee argues convincingly 
that a convention or rule of interpretation must establish · 
the ground of representation (and accordingly to significa-
tion) of the icon. 8 The point is this: according to 
Greenlee, 
It is not simply similarity, but similarity deter-
mined as resemblance which constitutes the ground of 
iconic signification ••• That is, since W.W • ••• 
similarities are not always recognized and since objects 
- similar to other objects do not always represent them 
iconically or through the similarity the obtains among 
·':: •-c: 1-them~ a convention or rule must have been established 
to the effect that the sign should be interpreted to 
·signify in a ce 9tain way, which is through some respect of resemblance. · . 
If this analysis by Greenlee . is correct, then the icon is 
symbolic since the symbol, as we shall see later, is a sign 
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which signifies by virtue of a law or convention. 
Greenlee feels that Peirce was confused on this 
point. That is, that Peirce did not realize the application 
of the categories was analytic in regard to developing this 
trichotomy and that Peirce did not realize that all signs 
involve a convention, law, or habit which serve to designate 
them as signs in some respect. Further, Greenlee believes 
that Peirce thought that this second trichotomy represented 
different modes of being of signs rather than different 
factors of the sign situation. But it's not at ~all clear 
that Peirce was confused on this point. Fbr instanc,, 
Peirce speaks of the icon and index as being degenerate 
forms of the sign, which may indicate that he realized 
quite well that all signs are thirds and that the symbol 
is a genuine sign while the icon and index are merely de-
generate forms of it. He says: 
G~nuine mediation is the character of a sign ••• 
signs have two degrees of degeneracy. A sign degenerate 
to a lesser degree, is an obsistent sign, or index, 
which is a sign wijose significance of its object is due 
to its having a g~nuine relation to -that object ir-
respective of the interpretant •••• A sign degenerate 
to the greater degree is an originalian sign, or icon, 
which is a sign wijoae significant virtue is due simply 
to its quality •••• A genuine sign is a transuasional 
sign, or symbol, which is a sign which owes its signi-
;·~· ·ficant virtue to a character which can only be realized 
by the aid of its interpretant." (2.92) 
I think passages like these are enough to indicate 
that Peirce was not confused about how he was using his 
categories. That is, he was quite clear that all signs 
were thirds by virtue of their triadic nature and that the 
symbol was a genuine third whil -e the icon and index were 
22 
degenerate thirds. But it is a degeneracy of thirdness, 
not a difference in modes of being. I do not think that it 
is quite fair to say that Peirce was confused because he 
did not generalize the conventionality of the symb~l to 
icon and index. He may have been convinced that their 
significance did not come from a convention but as he says 
above from a qualitative aspect for the icon and a genuine 
relation to its object for the index. 
I think the evidence indicates that Pe~roe believed 
that not all signs were conventional. For example in 2.246 
he says that "every conventional sign is a legisign but 
not conversely H.W •• " And in 3.361 Peirce says that the 
relation of the object of an index and the index does not 
lie in a mental association. And that it signifies its 
object solely by virtue of being really connected with it. 
All natural signs and physical symptoms are of this nature 
according to Peirce, and once again they are called degen- · 
erate signs. But in 2.303 Peirce gives a standard defin-
ition of a sign, explaining how a series of interpretants 
is produced and goes on to say that "no doubt intelligent 
consciousness must enter into the series." In numerous 
places Peirce says,"Nothing is a sign, unless it is inter-
preted as a sign." (2.307) or has the power to be interpreted 
as a sign. (1.542) Passages such as these give some indi-
cation that some kind of convention is involved in every 
sign, since a mental association may be construed as a 
t . 10 conven ion. But this is far from strong evidence. 
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If Peirce believed that not all signs require 
some degree of convention, we can still disagree with him. 
It seems to me that nothing is automatically a sign. That 
is nothing is a sign merely by virtue of a genuine relation 
to its object or by virtue of its qualitative resemblance 
to an object. That which functions as a sign must have 
some designation of it , a~ a sign. It is not merely by 
virtue of its capacity to act as such, because anything 
whatsoever has this capacity; anything can possibly function 
as a sign, but not everything is a sign. 11 
A sign is properly so called once it has the power 
to determine an interpretant. (1.542) Such a power, it 
seems to me, can only derive from some designation of a sign 
as a sign of a given thing, or a sign with a given meaning. 
In other words, a convention must be established which de-
signates something as functioning in such and such a sig-
nificative way. To say there are signs which have the power 
to produce interpretants without such convention would seem 
to destroy the essential thirdness of a sign. For if some-
thing produces an interpretant without a given mediating 
habit or convention, it seems to sink into a merely dyadic 
relation. We would not say that a knee jerk is the inter-
pretant of the sharp tap by the doctor's hammer. 12 Nor 
should we say that the interpreting of smoke as a sign of 
fire is an interpretation which does not involve a convention 
or prior designation of it as such a sign. For if it does 
not involve such a convention, how is it that we came to 
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interpret smoke as a sign of fire? If we say that smoke 
causes one to think of fire then this is a dyadic relation 
and not a triadic sign. Even in the example of the sun-
flower Peirce is hesitant about calling this a sign or even 
a representamen. 
A sign is a representamen with a mental inter-
pretant. Possibly there may be representamens that are 
not signs. Thus, if a sunflower, inturning towards 
the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, with-
out further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which 
turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, 
and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the 
sunflower would become a representa~en of the sun. But 
thought is the chief, if not only mode of representation. 
(2.274) 
Representation always involves thought, which is why things 
of nature in themselves have no power to signify unless 
thought by way of convention extends such power to them. 
But this is enough digreision for now. I will return to 
this issue toward the end of this thesis. 13 
Index: An index is a sign which refers to the object that 
it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that · 
object. It can not therefore be a qualisign, because 
qualities are what they are independently of anything 
else. In so far as the index is affected by the object, 
it necessarily has some quality in common with the object. 
It does, therefore, involve a sort of icon, although an 
icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not mere resemblance 
of its object, even in these respects which make it a 
sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the 
object. (2.248) 
· In this definition the relation of sign to object which sets 
off the index is that of "being really affected by the object." 
Obvious examples of such causal connectedness are a weath-
vane as a sign of the wind, a bullet hole as a sign of a gun, 
or a footprint as a sign of a foot, etc •• A not so obvious 
example Peirce gives is a ya~dstick which might be thought 
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of as an icon of a standard yard but is really an index of 
it since it is physically related in that it is a copy made 
from a mold of the standard yard. 
However, later redefinitions of the index ~end to 
blur the obvious distinction. 14 For example, Peirce later 
defines the index as follows: 
An index represents an object by virtue of its 
connection with it. It makes no difference whether the 
connection is natural, or artificial, or merely mental. 
There is, however, an important distinction between two 
classes of indices. Namely, some merely stand for things 
ot individual quasi-things with which the interpreting 
mind is already acquainted while others mau be used to 
ascertain facts. Of the former class which may be term-
ed · desi~nations; personal demonstrative, and relative 
pronouns, proper names, the letters attached to a 
geometrical figure, and the ordinary letters of algebra 
are examples. They act to force attention to the things 
intended. Designat:bns are absolutely indispensable for 
communication and thought. No assertion has any mean-
ing unless there is some designation to show whether the 
universe of r$ality or what universe of fiction is re-
,· - :·· ·fjrred to. The other class of indeces may be called 
reagents. Thus water placed in a vessel with a shaving 
of camphor thrown upon it will show whether the vessel 
is clean or not ••• just as a designation can denote 
nothing unless the interpreting mind is already ac-
quainted with the thing it denotes, so a reagent can 
indicate nothing unless the mind is already acquainted 
with its connection with the phenomenon it indicates. 
(8.365n) 
Elsewhere Peirce says: 
The index asserts nothing! It only says, "There!". 
It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly 
directs them to a particular object, and there it stops. 
Demonstrative and relative pronouns are merely pure 
indices because they denote things without describing 
them. (3.361) 
Peirce says the pointing finger is the type of this class. 
The problem that begins to arise is that the actual 
physical connection between index and object seems to be 
missing in some of the cases described. The best one can 
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say for th~ pointing . finger is that there is a connection . 
of spatial contiquity. But in this case we would certainly 
have to say that one must know what the significance of a 
pointing finger is before it can serve to point to _anything. 
Have you ever tried to direct a baby's attention to some-
thing by pointing at it only to have the baby stare blankly 
at the tip of your finger? Personal pronouns and relative 
pronouns may also be said to be spatially related to their . 
objects, but what about proper names which are now also in-
cluded as indices? Often one cannot even assume a spatial 
connection. The beat it does is to force the attention ot 
thought on the idea of the particular person it denotes. 
The connection now between index and object may be 
natural, artificial or merely mental. It would seem that 
with this new redefinition, the feature which may distinguish 
an inde~ from other signs is all but lost. For if every sign 
has · an object and every sign directs attention to its object, 
should not every sign be considered !n index, if indeed the 
connection may be artificial or merely mental as well as 
natural? I think we must answer yes. And I think Greenlee 
is quite right to point out this deterioration of the dis-
tinguishing feature of an index. 15 The best one can say 
for Peirce's exposition of the index is that it may be de~-
scriptive of an essential chara6teri~tic or power of a sign; 
that of forcing attention on an object or of the .indexical 
quality of signs. The class of indices indicates the dynam-
ic ~~ower of signs and so is at least akin to the original 
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definition of index as having a real physical relation to 
its object. The extent to which every sign has . the dynamic 
power to force attention is the extent to which it is in-
dexical in character. 
But is the index also dependent on convention for 
its significative capacity, as the icon seemed to be? Here 
again I think that the most plausible answer is yes~ Not 
only is a convention or habit of interpretation usually re-
quired to recognize the significance of an index (as for 
instance the pointing finger), but as Greenlee points out: 
:i • • • a pointing finger might be aimed at the sur-
face of an object, or at the color, size, motion, glint 
and so on, or all of these. Some property or complex 
of properties must be stated or supposed. ,.The provi-
. :~ sion for the condition is W.W •• • • the meaning or 16 . reference to an index as a ground of representation. 
It is the selection of an aspect of the object in terms 
of a standpoint of representation. In short the stand-
point from which the index represents an object is con-
-ditioned not only by dynamical connection, but also by 
a convention of interpretation appointing it as a sign 
and selecting 19r abstracting the relevant aspect of re-presentation. · · 
The point is that some .sort of convention is required to 
. distinguish exactly what the index is pointing to among the 
many possibilities. 
The convention involved is a decision to appoint the 
index as representing its object in respect to certain as-
pects and limiting the possible scope of the index. Cer-
tainly there .are many objects which are more naturally fit 
to serve as signs of other objects~ but a recognition of 
this fact and designation or something as a sign is required . 
in order to escape a mere dyadic relation. For example, 
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there is nothing intrinsic to the nature of smoke to make 
one think of fire. If someone never saw smo~e and fire to-
gether, there would be no reason to say smoke was a sign of 
fire. We do learn that fire causes smoke and so e~sily de-
termine that smoke is a sign of fire, but this is a mental 
connection and designation. Once this designation is made, 
smoke is a sign of fire. A limitation of the range of the 
smoke as a sign is also involved. It might have been de-
signated a sign of heat or a sign of any combustible mater-
ial (wood, coal, gas etc.). Eventually it may be a sign 
of all these things. 
Symbol: A symbol is a representamen whose representative 
character consists precisely in its being a rule that 
will determine its interpretant. All words, sentences, 
books and other conventional signs are symbols. We 
speak of writing or pronouncing the word "man", but it 
is only a replica or embodiment of the word, that is 
pronounced or written. The word itself has·~no existence 
although it has real being, consisting in the fact that 
existents will conform to it. (2.292) A symbol is a 
sign which refers to the object that it denotes by vir-
tue of a law, usually an association of general ideas,· 
which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted 
as referring to that object. (2.249) 
The connection a symbol has to its object, then, is 
a purely conventional one. A rule prescribes that things 
of such and such a type shall be interpreted as referring 
to such and such an object. 18 And according to Peirce a 
"genuine symbol" is general and has a general meaning. For 
example, the word "bird" is a general type and has the gen-
eral meaning or concept which the word "bird" signifies, 
i.e. a thing having wings, a body more or less covered with 
feathers, a beak; and usually able to fly, etc •• But Peirce 
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also allows for two degenerate forms of symbol which can 
denote individuals. There is the "singular symbol", "whose 
object is an existent individual and which signifies only 
such characters as that individual may realize." (?.293) 
An example of this would be the word "Charlemagne", which 
is itself general but refers to a particular individual, 
i.e. Charlemagne himself. And it is interesting to note that 
here a -·proper name is identified as a degenerate or singular 
symbol while in 8.J65n a proper name is identified as an 
index. But this will present no problem if we affirm that 
all signs are symbolic and indexical in character and 
whether one should be classed as index or symbol depends on 
which aspect of a given sign we are considering at the mo-
ment. The other degenerate symbol Peirce calls the "abstract 
symbol whose only object is a character". (2.293) Presumably 
an example of this type of' symbol would be words such as 
"redness", "bignessn, Photness", etc. which name qualities · 
or abstract properties. Peirce, consistent with his analysis 
of the categories, regards these not as general but as uni-
ver .sal. This explains how a general symbol may refer to 
individuals, but the question might legitimately be put as 
to whether a symbol must itself. ,be · general as Peirce seems 
to imply in 2.292 above and in other places where he seems 
to equate it with a legisign or type. (2.249) We do some-
times speak of individuals as symbols. For instance, 
Socrates, as a particular individual, is sometimes taken 
as symbolic of the Philosopher in general, or steadfast 
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honesty, or scrupulous honor, or other superlative qualities. 
But we would hardly want to say that Socrates was a type 
when he was such a unique and special individual. Certainly 
he is a conventional symbol of these various things . to 
certain people and not precisely an icon, or index, but he 
is also not a general type. He is a real individual. It 
may be wise to disregard the restriction of generality for 
· symbols which belong to the ontological classification of 
signs of the first trichotomy and stick to the basis of 
division originally stated, that being the connection of 
sign to object, which in the case of symbol is a connection 
of thought and-nothing more; a convention solely. 
One should not identify the symbol with the legi-
sign or type. But the general symbol does not indicate any 
particular thing; it denotes a kind of thing, according to 
Peirce. (2.301) The kind which Peirce is talkin~ about is 
an idea or concept. He says ordinary words such as "give"~ 
"bird", and "marriage" are examples 9f symbols and also that 
they are applicable to "whatever may realize the idea con-
neoted with these words." These words do not show us birds 
or marriages or giving, but it is understood that we can 
imagine such things and have an adequate concept of such 
things, which we are able . to associate with whatever realizes 
the idea connected with the words. (2.298) The object of a 
genuine symbol then, is an idea or concept; a concept of a 
bird, or a marriage or a giving, etc •• And this may even 
be the object of a singular symbol, i.e. a concept of 
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"Charlemagne" rather than Charlemagne himself is what the 
symbol refers to by itself, although ultimately . it refers . 
to the real individual Charlemagne. And the same may be 
said for the abstract symbol. This idea or concept. is the 
· ground of the symbol. · So when a symbol is applied to a 
certain object; it refers to it not in all respects, but in 
respect to that ground. 
Let me bring this discussion to a close with a 
summation. The basis of division of this trichotomy is that 
of relation of sign to object. Certainly the actual re-
lation of icon to its object is a real physical connection. 
And the relation of symbol to .object is a merely mental or 
conventional one. But these distinctions begin to blur 
once we realize that the icon and index both require a con-
vention or mental connection in order for them to . have any . 
significative power. But this blurring is not solely the 
. fault of this expanded concept of signs which Peirce may or 
may not have endorsed. It is also partly due to a certain · 
expansion of the concept of some of the signs in his own 
· thoqght. For instance, we saw in the discussion of index 
that Peirce eventually disregarded the real physical or 
causal connection. Such an expansion takes in all signs, 
since all signs point to an object and it was this "pointin~ 
to" which eventually became the distinguishing feature of 
the index. Such a blurring of distinctions may not be help-
ful in preserving the cat~gorial structure -of Peirce's sign 
theory; but it does serve to bring out some of the important 
.... 
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·features of the sign relation. Two of the most important 
o~ these features are the conventionality and the inten-
tionality of signs. The blurring of the distinctions by 
Peirce may be symptomatic of .some confusion on his .. part, 
but it may also be symptomatic only of a realization on · 
his part that a certain amount of blurring is unavoidable. 
Whether or not he was aware of the ontological (hypostatic) 
and analytic (factmrial) distinction betw .een the uses he . 
made of his categories, serves to bring out the key features 
of the sign relation. 
The Third Trichotomy: 
How the Interpretant Represents the Object 
The third tric~otomy is made according as the sign's 
· interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, . a sign 
of fact or a sign of reason. And according to this division 
a sign may be a rheme, a dicent sign (or .dicisign) or an 
argument. 
Rheme: "A rheme is a sign which for its interpretant, is a 
sign of qualitative possibility, that is, is understood as 
representing such and such a kind of possible object."(2.250) 
Rhemes are the -qualities attached to an object in a propo-
'sition, for instance in the proposition "John is a man and 
John is .mortal'', man atid mortal are signs of the qualitative 
possibilities which are concepts that could be attached to 
John. They are rhemes because the interpretant represents 
them as signs of qualitative possibilities. 
Dicisign: A d·icent sign ( or dicisign) is a sign, which, 
for its interpretant is a sign of actual existence. It 
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cannot therefore, be an · icon, which affords no ground 
for an interpretation of it as referring to actual . 
existence. A dicisign necessarily involves~ as a part 
of it, a rheme, to describe the fact which it is inter-
preted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of 
rheme; and while it is essential to the dicisign, it by 
no mearis constitutes it." (2.251) 
While a rheme is a term of a proposition or argument, the 
dicisign is the proposition itself. The terms are considered 
to" ·be ~hemes because they represent possibilities. A pro-
position is considered to be a dicisign because it •represents 
(or purports to re~resent) an actual . existent ot fact. 
Peirce take~ the position that "every kind of proposition 
is either meaningless or has · a realsecondness as its object." 
(2.315) This is why the dicent sign ls taken as referring 
to an actual exiitent. 
Argument: . an argument is a sign which for its interpretant 
is a sign of law. Or we may say that a rheme is a sign 
which is ~nderstood to represent its obje-0t in its 
characters merely; that a dicisign is~ sign which is 
understood to repiresent its object in respect to actual 
existence; and an argument is a sign which is under-
stood to represent its object in its chatacter as a 
sign. (2.252) The interpretant of an argument re-
presents it as an instance of a general ~lass of ar-
guments, which class on the whole will always tend to 
the truth. It is this law, in some shape, which the 
argument urges; and this "-urging" is the . mode of re-
presentation proper to arguments. The. argument must, 
therefore, be a symbol, or sign whose object is a 
general law or type. (2.253) 
The interpretant of the argument as ·a law or general which 
indicates that all arguments of its type tend toward the 
truth. There is not much that needs to be said here except 
to note the cate~orial development of the division. The 
interpretant represents its object as either a possible 
existent, an actual existent or a . general existent (iaw). 
The division also obviously p~rallels the parts of an 
or should be given up. They have been and are important 
in bringing out the features of the sign relatiqn and of 
. signs themselves and they may be useful in keeping these 
features and functions of signs clear. Ontological dis-
tin6tions are not necessary. Since all signs have been 
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put in the category of thirdness, the .analytic distinctions 
based on the qualities and features which various signs 
exhibit should be enough for understanding different classes 
if signs. Indeed, we may find that the basic characteristic 
of signs, as opposed to sign vehicles, is of the nature of 
thought or generality. 
P:[namical Objects, Immediate Objects, Dynamic Interpretants 
Immediate Interpretants, Final Interpretants 
It is important in understanding Peirce and in under-
standing sign theory to get clear the distinctions Peirce 
makes between two types of objects and three types of 
interpretants. 
Immediate Object, Dynamical Object: In his letters to 
Lady Welby and other correspondence) Peirce discusses this 
distinction. It is my contention that the immediate object 
is what Peirce described earlier as the ground and the 
dynamic object is that which the immediate object or ground 
is the ground of. Peirce says this: 
. As to the object, that may mean the object as cog-
nized in the sign and therefore ·as idea, or it may be 
the 6bject as it is regardless of any aspect of it, the 
object in such relations as unlimited and final study 
would show it to be. The former I call the immediate 
object, the latter the dynamical object. (8.183) We. 
must distinguish between the immediate object - i.e. 
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the object as represented in the sign, and the real (no, 
because perhaps the object is altogether fictive, I 
must choose a different term, therefore), say rather 
the dynamical object, ••• which i't can only "indicate" 
and leave the inter:preter to find out by "collateral 
experience". (8.314) ••• a sign has two objects, its 
its object as it is represented and its object _jn it-
self. · (8.333) 
If we compare these remarks with Peirce's earlier statements 
about a sign not . referring to its object in all respect~ 
but in respect to a certain idea which he called the ground, 
we can see the similarity of the immediate object and the 
ground. Both refer to the object as represented in acer-
tain idea or abstract notion of the object and both refer 
to the object as being represented not in all respects but 
in refe~ence to this sort of idea. The dynamical objett is 
of course the same as the obj~ct itself or that which the 
ground represents. The reason this object is called dynam-
ical is that according to Peirce it is the object which 
determines · the signs and also mediately through the sign 
the interpretant. (see 8.179) It is this dynamic deter-
mination which gives the dynamical object its name. The 
dynamical object is also that with which previous experience 
is assumed by the sign or utterer of a sign. 
The person who interprets a W.W. sentence (or any 
other sign whatsoever) must be determined by the object 
of it through collateral · observation quite independently 
of the action of the sign. Otherwise he will not be 
determined to thought of that object ••• a habit has 
been established in him by which that word calls up a 
variety of attributes of a given object W.W •• (8.178) 
The ·sign has no meaning unless you have had some , previous 
acquaintence or knowledge of its object, wh~ther it be by 
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direct apprehension or by indirect description. It is 
through this previous acquaintence that the object determines 
the sign and mediately the interpretant. The immediate 
object then is of the nature of a sign since all thought 
is in signs. The dynamical object may have the nature of 
any other category since it is possible for things of any 
category to be objects of signs. The dynamical object may 
be a sign since we can talk about signs or a real actual 
existent object or a general object such as a law or a 
universal object such as a quality. 
Immediate, Dynamical and Final Interpretant: This distinc-
tion is not quite as clearly made as the one between im-
.mediate and dynamical objects. And since it may not be as 
important to our later discussion, I will only deal with 
it briefly. 
The three interpretants which a sign may have are: 
1. its interpretant as represented or meant to be under-
stood (this is the immediate interpretant); 2. its inter-
pretant as it is produced (this is the dynamical inter-
pretant); 3. its interpretant in itself (this is the final 
interpretant). (8.183, 8.314315, 8.333) The immediate 
interpretant is the intended meaning of the utterer or all 
that the sign is intended to mean. As such it is not really 
an interpretant since it is not what is actually produced 
by the sign. But according to Fitzgerald it deserves the 
name "interpretant", "because of its role as a ground for 
the relation between sign and interpretant. 1121 This is 
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· interesting if this is how Peirce thought of the immediate 
interpretant. That is, it is analogous to the immediate 
object in that both serve a~ a ground. The dynamical 
interpretant is the actual . interpretant produced by the 
sign. This is what one thinks or does when one interprets 
a sign. This is the interpretant which we normally talk 
about and which Peirce usually means when he talks about 
interpretants. Peirce's concept of a final interpretant 
is one which meshes well with •his pragmatism. It is im-
portant in understanding the relation between Peirce's 
pragmatism and his sign theory. The final interpretant 
is that which would finally be decided to be the true inter-
pretation if consideration of the matter were carried so 
far that an ultimate opinion were reached. The connection 
. is this: . the sign relation requires an interpretant. The 
interpretant is an effect of the sign. This ·effect is the 
meaning of the sign. · However, it is n6t always the intended 
meaning nor is it the final or full meaning. That i.s, it 
does not always give a complete conception of its object. 
All thought and knowledge is by way of signs. The essential 
incompleteness of knowledge is at least in part due to the 
incompleteness of the interpretants of signs. 
There is another point at which Peirce's pragmaticism 
can be seen as an outgrowth of his sign theory. The dynam-
ical interpretant seems to be subdivided into · an ·emotional, 
energetic and logical interpretant. 22 Briefly, the emotional 
interpretant is the first feeling one has at the comprehehsion 
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of a linguistic sign or the feeling some signs, such as a 
musical composition or an abstract painting, may produce. 
(5.475) The energetic interpretant is an effect or exer-
tion which "may be a muscular one as in the case of the 
command to ground arms, but it is much more usually an 
exertion upon the inner world, a mental effort II • • • • 
(5.475), but it can never be the meaning of an intellectual 
concept since such a meaning is general while the energetic 
interpretant is a single act. The meaning of an intellectual 
concept and the pragmatic meaning of a statement is to be 
found in the logical interpretant. The logical interpretant 
is a sign which may produce its own interpretant. This is 
where it differs from the energetic and emotional inter-
pretants which may terminate in an action or emotion. 
The logical interpretant may end in what Peirce 
calls the ultimate logical interpretant. 23 This interpre-
tant is a habit. A habit is a disposition to act in such 
and such a way under certain circumstances. A habit is a 
would be and so a member of thirdness. It can be expressed 
in conditional form. (If such and such circumstance,arises 
I will react in such and such manner. 24) The pragmatic maxim 
is that: 
••• every theoretical judgement expressible in 
a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form 
of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in 
its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim 
expressible in a conditional sentence having its apodosis 
in the imperative mood. (5.18) 
The meaning of a theoretical judgement expressible in a 
sentence sign in the imperative mood is the ultimate 
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logical interpretant of that sign which interpretant io a 
habit concerning practical action to be taken is the state-
ment is true. 
At this point we can see how Peirce's theory of 
signs meshes nicely with his pragmaticism. The meaning of 
a general concept is found in its ultimate logical inter-
pretant which is a practical habit of action. This does 
not mean that every sign produces an ultimate logical inter-
pretant or that every theoretical judgement results in an 
ultimate logical interpretant. The production of such an 
interpretant usually requires some inquiry and mental 
exertion on the part of the interpreter. The production 
of. such a habit also should not be seen as the dead end of 
the logical interpretant chain. It is more like an indefinite 
resting place. The habit is subject to change for it is 
itself an interpretant sign. The ultimate logical inter-
pretant should gradually approach the final interpretant. 2' 
That the ultimate logical interpretant must be a 
habit which is open to modification is made necessary by 
Peirce's requirement that any interpretant is itself a sign 
and so must be capable of .producing a further interpretant. 
Modification of a habit by either mental or physical ex-
perimentation to determine its results might be considered 
the interpretant of that previously established habit. The 
ultimate logical interpretant as a habit may be based on 
an accurate conditional statement about its effects on the 
world, but the theoretical req,uirements of Peirce's sign 
Chapter III 
WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF A SIGN? 
As we learned from earlier discussion we must 
distinguish between two objects: the immediate object and 
the dynamical object. The dynamical object is the object 
in itself. The immediate object is that concept or idea 
we have from previous aquaintance with the dynamical object. 
Here it will be worthwhile to go into some detail. When we 
ask what the object of a sign is, we must be clear about 
what we are asking. First, we must be clear as to whether 
we are referring to the immediate or dynamical object. 
Secondly, we must be clear as to whether we mean what the 
object of a given sign is or what is the nature of (or what 
may function as) the object of signs in general. Therefore 
let us take these questions one nt a time. 
First, we will consider what ~he nature of the dynam-
ical object is and what may serve as a dynamical object. 
Secondly, we will consider what might be the object of some 
specific signs, which might present problems to the doctrine 
that every sign has an object. Thirdly, we will consider 
the nature of the immediate object. Finally, we will try 
to show how this immediate-dynamic object distinction might 
be applied to bring light to some difficult passages in 
Peirce. 
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What, then, is the nature of the dynamical object 
and what may serve as the dynamical object of a sign? The 
answer to the second part is very simply, anyhting. Any-
thing may serve as a dynamical object. Anything that exists 
either independently of the mind or in imagination may be 
a dynamical object. Anything which may be talked about 
whether it is real or fictive may be a dynamical object. 
Peirce says this about the object of a sign: 
The objects - for a sign may have any number of 
them - may each be a single known existing thing or a 
thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to 
exist, or a collection of such things, or a known 
quality, or relation or fact, which single object may 
be a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some 
other mode of being, such as some act permitted whose 
being does not prevent its negation from being equally 
permitted, or something of a general nature desired, 
required, or invariably found under certain circumstances. 
(2.232) 
It is clear from this passage that Peirce's concept 
of object is broad ~nough to include things from any of his 
categories of being and virtually anything which can be 
talked about. He includes relations, qualities, facts, 
existents, fictive beings, possible beings, thoughts, habits, 
laws, actuals, etc •• We should not restrict our search for 
the object of a specific sign to any one mode of being such 
as actual existents, or even to real objects as opposed to 
fictive objects. Anything may function as an object and it 
may have any mode of being. 
Next we turn our attention to some specific signs 
to determine what their objects might be. Here thp question 
arises as to whether ·every ·sign ha~ ···an : object. There is no 
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question about this for Peifce. For him every sign must 
have an object. This is an essential part of the sign re-
lation. The sign always points away from itself to an 
object. A sign "refers to", "represents", or "stands for" 
something else. A sign does not always stand for something 
else in the sense of "standing in place of" as a variable 
may stand in place of a term in a symbolic sentence. The 
relationship of sign to object should be understood in the 
general sense of reference or representation. The sign re-
fers to or points to its object. Just as we might say thought 
is always thought of something, a sign is always a sign of 
something. Perhaps it may be useful here to make the dis-
tinction which Peirce draws from the scholastics: that of a 
thing being in the mind actualiter and habitualiter. "A 
notion is in the mind 'actualiter' when it is actually con-
ceived; it is in the mind 'habitualiter' when it can directly 
produce a conception." (8.18) For Peirce there are two 
ways a thought is in th .e mind or two ways a thought might 
be said to exist. 
We might apply a similar distinction to signs. But 
this distinction sho ·uld be made in terms of functioning ( or 
in terms of the power of a sign to function as a sign). A 
sign does not have an object when it is not functioning as 
a sign or when it is actually being interpreted. This is 
similar to the point made earlier about the distinguishing 
feature of a sign. That is, a thing is a sign when it has 
the power to determine an interpretant and along with this 
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the power to point to an object. 
Now although a sign is said to be a sign when it has 
the power to refer to an object, this does not mean that it 
refers to one and only one object. It can refer to an object 
but just what particular object it will refer to depends on 
the context in which it actually functions. For example, 
the word "bird'' may be said to have a range of objects to 
which it may potentially refer, but taken by itself it re-
fers to no object in particular. The word "bird'' may re-
fer to any particular bird given the proper context or it 
may refer to the class of birds or it may refer to the 
characteristics possessed by birds. The point is, that while 
it is not functioning it possess the power to refer to these 
objects, but it does not actually refer to any of them and 
it can not actually refer to any of them until it f~nctions 
in some context. So it has no objects, only the power to 
refer to some object when it functions. For a sign to have 
this power or potentiality, a convention is at least a 
necessary condition. 
Possession of this power is the fundamental basis 
of distinction between signs and non-signs. But signs only 
have an object or interpretant when they are actually exer-
cising this power. 
Signs very rarely if ever, function in isolation. 
When they function they are sinsigns or sign-vehicles of here 
and now, set in a context of other signs. Even actual 
thought is a sinsign. It is a thought of here and now also 
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set in the context of other signs. The object of here and 
now sinsigns is determined by their context. For example, 
we are usually not concerned about the object of individual 
letters of the alphabet. For instance, what is the object 
of the letter "P"? We might want to say that it is a rule 
or pronounciation or a rule or package of rules about how 
it may function or how we may use it. Certainly the letter 
"P" is a sign and so it should have an object. In this 
context we might plausibly say that the above rule is the 
object of "P 11• 27 But the letter "P" is an almost purely 
functional sign. That is, it usually has no object or 
meaning except as part of a larger sign, and whatever is the 
object of .the larger sign is the object of"P". The object 
of "P" is determined by its context when it is used. Suppose 
we say that "P" is used in the word "Person''• The object 
of "P" is really not the question now. The question is, 
"What is the object of 'Personi .?" By itself the word "Person" 
may have as its object the general concept of a human being. 
But in the larger sign, "That person is tall", Person is 
part of the sign "That person" which has as its object whom-
ever the utterer means "That person" to refer to. The point 
of this is to indicate that looking for the object of each 
individual sign may not be fruitful. If we consider the sign 
to be a functional entity it is best to determine its object 
when it is actually functioning significatively. Some signs 
rarely if ever have an object except in conjunction with 
other signs. Signs such as "the'', "a", "some", and "most" 
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are examples. 
There is support for this view in Peirce. For ex-
ample he says, 
As for a noun, considering the meaning which it has 
in the sentence, and not as standing by itself~ it is 
most conveniently regarded as a portion of a symbol. 
Thus the sentence, "every man loves a woman" is equiva-
lent to "whatever is a man loves something that is a 
woman". Here "whatever" is a universal selective index, 
"is a man" is a symbol, "loves" is a symbol, "something 
that'' is a particular selective index and "is a woman" 
is a symbol. (2.296) 
We also find him discussing the symbol "loveth" • 
• • • let us take as an example of a symbol the 
word "loveth" •••• Now we are to understand that 
"loveth" occurs in a sentence; for what it may mean by 
itself if it means anything, is not the question. Let 
the sentence then, be "Ezekiel loves Huldah". Exekiel 
and Huldah must then be or contain indices; for without 
indices it is impossible to designate what one is talk-
ing about. Now the effect of the word 11loveth" is that 
the pair of objects denoted by the pair of indices 
Ezekiel and Huldah is ·represented by the icon or the 
image we have in our minds of a lover and his beloved. 
(2.295) 
If we were to analize this entire sign we would have to say 
that it is perhaps three separate objects. Obviously Ezekiel 
is one, Huldah is one, and not so obviously, the particular 
relationship of loving is the other. Taken together as one 
· sign, "Ezekiel loves Huldah" is a sign of one object, i.e. 
the Ezekiel - Huldah love relationship. This type of analysis 
can, I think, be done for any language sign. 
Every language sign or word is symbolic. As such 
it is a general type as pointed out earlier. If it is taken 
by itself it refers to a general. In the case of common 
nouns such as "man", "dog", "bird", "people" etc. they re-
fer to general concepts of those types of things. But they 
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. may also refer to particula!s simply by using them to de-
note any individual who possesses the properties associated 
with that word. In the case of indexical pronouns such as 
"this", "that", etc., if taken by themselves, they may be 
said to r~fer to the general concepts of thisness or that-
ness. But most often they are used to refer to a specific 
object in a given context. In the case of artieles such as 
"a" or "the'', we may say that they refer to the concepts of 
definiteness or indefiniteness. But again they usually 
attach to a noun or pronoun and take on its object. Verbs 
have the general concepts of the statos of being or action 
a~ their references. Conjunctions and prepositions have 
relational concepts as their references. 
All words, if considered individually, must be con-
strued as symbols and are therefore general and as such 
their objects are general. But many words, especially 
articles, demonstrative pronouns, or prepositions are fune~ 
tional sings. That is, when they are instantiated in ,a token 
of themselves, they become parts of larger signs and so the 
question becomes, "What is the object of the larger sign?" , 
And in these cases the sign can be a sign of anything (fic-
tional, actual, general, or merely possible). For instance, 
if I ask my wife, "Is it raining?" the object is my desire 
to know the state of the weather. If I say, "Unicorns eluate 
every captor save a virgin.", this has as its object an im-
aginary being. Now the question may arise as to whether 
this sign really does refer to an object. It is quite true 
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that it does not refer to a real object or real secondness, 
but it does nevertheless refer to an object which exists 
even if it only exists in the imagination. And if the con-
text is such that the proposition is taken to refer to what 
people imagine about unicorns, it is a proposition about 
a real state of affairs, i.e. the things people really im-
agine or believe about unicorns. 
So far we have only considered specific words and 
their objects and I think we have shown that we can find a 
plausible object for any word. But what about other types 
of signs, such as those which we generally refer to as 
natural signs, or signs such as colors, or signs such as 
motions or actions. If our analysis of all signs as re-
quiring a convention and at least to some degree symbolic 
is correct, then a similar explanation of their objects be 
possible. Once again, we must emphasis the distinction be-
tween the sign actually instantiated in a sign situation 
and the sign conceived as :separate from any sign situation. 
Let us take one of Peirce's favorite examples, that of the 
weathervane. Any actual weathervane has as its object the 
wind which is blowing it at any particular instant, and 
more specifically the wind in respect to its direction. A 
particular weathervane abstracted from any situation may 
not have any object at all. It may just be an ornament on 
someone's early american-style livingroom wall. But if we 
want to consider the weathervane as a type of which any 
particular weathervane is a token, its object is not any 
49 
actual wind but only the concept of wind ' direction. The 
same is true of qualities such as "redness". Redness, if 
designated as a sign .of danger, is a •sign of the particular 
· danger it is alerting us to at any particular time. But 
again, a convention is required if a sign is to have the 
power to refer to its object. 28 Actions and hand motions 
likewise are only tokens of types whi6h we deem significant 
in some respect. When I put up my hand with the palm facing 
out it is usually taken as meaning stop. Its object is my 
particular desire or expectation to have you stop at that . 
time. That particular hand motion . is just a tokeri of a type 
which ~e have conventionally given significance. Its object 
taken as a type is the general idea of stopping. A particular 
life or action may be said to be a sign. As such it would 
have as its dynamical object whatever it is thought to be 
significant oT. The object of the life of Socrates may be 
Socrates himself or it may be "the steadfast pursuit of 
truth" or it may be philosophers in general, dependiqg on 
the context in which Socrates is used as a sign. We could 
go on, but I think that this should be sufficient to make 
the point. The point is this: it is usually not difficult 
to determine the object of a sign once it is put in a con-
text or more specifically once it actually functions as a 
sign. 
In the above explanations I spoke of signs as ab-
stracted from a sign situation. But this may be misleading. 
Strictly speaking, I do not think we encounter any signs 
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which are abstracted from a sign situation. T.his is where 
the necessarily triadic nature of a sigh may become clear. 
A sign is not the same as the sign vehicle. A sign is a 
triadic r.elation of object - sign - vehicle - inte~pretant. 
Anything at all can be a si~n-vehicle but what makes a , sign-
vehi6le a sign is its power to bring an interpretant into 
a relation with its object. (1.542) A convention is re-
quired i~ order that a sign-vehicle and anything of the ·same 
type have this power. By this I mean that a convention is 
a necessary condition in the making of a sign, for without 
it the bare facts of significant resemblance or physical 
connection are not enough to produce the triadic connection 
and give the sign-vehicle the power to determine an inter-
pretant and point to an object. Usually this convention 
is much more complex than just that things of such and such 
typ~ will refer to such and such object and have such and 
such interpr~tant. The conventiori is tied to a maze of other 
conventions about how various types ~re related in various 
situations. Even if taken by itself, the sign is in acer-
tain context, i.e. the context of being considered outside 
of an elaborate sign situation. In this context the sign 
may have as its object the conventions and rules about how 
the word is used or it may· ·have as its object a general con-
cept, so even in this situation it is functioning as a sign. 
Whenever a sign functions, it functions triadically and that 
means it is connecting an interpretant to an object. With-
out a · convention this connection cjn not be made in a way 
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adequate to produce a sign. Signs are nbt actual signs 
unless they are functioning and when they funct:i.on they are 
necessarily triadic. When they are not functioning they 
have no specific object but are capable of directly pointing 
to one. 
On the above interpretation it seems almost tautologi-
cal to say all signs have an object but there is some dis~ 
pute on the issue. Greenlee argues that although a· sign 
always points away from itself, the pointing is not always 
to something referred to, represented or stood for. What 
the sign always points to, according to Greenlee, is its 
interpretant. His point is that not all signs are referential 
in the sense that proper names are and to look for an object 
where there is none or where the finding of on.e requires a 
stretching of the meaning of "object" beyond recognition is 
not useful. 
This kind of stretched reasoning, according to 
Greenlee, is brought out in the example of tiger tracks. 
A hunter comes across fresh tiger tracks and interprets 
them as signs of a tiger in the surroundings. According 
to Peirce, the dynamical object is that with which · the ~ign 
pres .upposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further 
information concerning it. (2.231) The dynamical object, 
according to Greenlee, is the tiger which made the tracks 
and the immediate object is the tiger as represented by the 
tracks interpreted by the hunter. Now, he says, change this 
sftua tion so that the - tracks are not of a tiger but are 
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blurred so that the hunter takes them to be tracks of a 
tiger. The hunter is mistaken and the object he takes them 
to be the sign of is fictive. 
Greenlee says now the immediate object is ~o tiger 
as qualified by the relation of being represented by a sign 
interpreted by the hunter, but is an imaginary construct in 
the hunter's mind, built out of past experience of tigers. 
And what this amounts to is that the object is the past ex-
perience as relevant to the present sign. Greenlee then 
says: 
I suggest that Peirce's statement that the object 
is what there must have been previous experience of in 
order that the sign be significant be changed to read 
that the object is that relevant previous experience 
itself. The point of reducing the immediate object to 
relevant previous experience is to obtain a conception 
of the object of the sign which is illustrated by any 
signification. 
Now any possible instance of signification is similar 
to the one just discussed insofar as experience is 
re-presented and provides the basis for the sign func~ 
tion. If one wishes, then, to preserve Peirce's language 
and to insist that all signs represent "objects", just~ 
: __ r -~ification for this insistance can be extracted from the 
argument that every sign re-presents an object because 
it presupposes previous experience on the part 2~f the interpreter in order to be significant to him. 
The point Greenlee seems to be making is that since 
we are sometimes deceived by signs or because we sometimes 
misinterpret the actual object of a sign, that which we think 
is the object is not an object at all in the "normal" sense 
of the word object. That is, there is no real referent of 
the sign. There is only an interpretant which is an imagin-
ary object produced by the sign. At best, according to 
Greenlee, this might be said to be an object only in that 
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it requires the re-presentation of an experience which is 
the basis of the imagining. One would believe this is what 
Greenlee means, but cannot be certain since he makes no 
clear statement about what he considers to be the .familar 
sense of "refers to", "represents", "stands for" or "object". 
From this example one gets the impression he means 
external object or object . external to the mind, because in 
the first instance of the example the tiger really did make 
the track and so its immediate object according to Greenlee 
was the "tiger as represented by the _tracks", while in the 
second instance in which the track was not made by a tiger 
but only thought to be made by a tiger, the immediate ob-
ject is, according to Greenlee, "an imaginary construct in 
the hunter's mind". The problem here seems to be the idea 
which Greenlee appears to have that the immediate object in 
each case is different. That is, in the first case the im-
mediate object is the "tiger as represented by the tracks 
interpreted by the hunter", while in the second case the 
immediate obje .ct is "no tiger as qualified by the relation 
of being represented by a sign, but an imaginary construct 
in the hunter's mind, built out of past experience." Just 
what Greenlee .. ·.means by "tiger represented by the tracks" is 
unclear. Does he mean that it is an independently existing 
figer as represented by the track" (something distinct from 
the independently existinf tiger who makes the track) or 
does he mean that it is an imaginary construct which the 
hunter has in his mind? If he means something like the for-
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mer, it is a rather difficult meaning to grasp. If he means 
something like the latter, then it would seen to be the same 
as the immediate object in the second instance. And this 
is my point. The immediate object of the track is not dif-
ferent in the two cases. The immediate object of the track 
is a mental construct in both cases. 
This brings us to the question of what the nature 
· of the immediate object is. As noted earlier, the immediate 
objec~ is "the object as cognized in the sign and therefore 
· an idea." (8.183) The immediate object is always a mental 
construct or idea or concept or whatever you may prefer to 
call it. You may call it imaginary if you do not think it 
has an actual parallel in the world of entities independent 
of our thought of them~ but the actual character of the con-
. cept or construct is the same. The immediate object is an 
idea and so is of the nature of thought and therefore a 
sign, since all thought is in signs. Greenlee, then, has 
given a faulty analysis of this sign situation. In both 
cases the sign is a token of a type which the }:).unter has 
learned signifies a tig~r. The blurred track is enough like 
the type which the hunter has determ!n~d is significant, so 
that he takes it to be a token of that type. The ~ource of 
the sign is not import~nt in this respect. The dynamical 
object is not merely that which .made the sign. If this were 
true, then the dynamical object of every written or spoken 
word would be the one who spoke it or wrote it. The dynamical 
object of "Napolean" would be in this case Bill West since 
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he just wrote the word. 'l.1he dynamical object is so named 
because of its dynamic character. That is, the . dynamical 
·object "determines" the _sign. But Peirce cautions agains:t 
taking "determines" in too narrow a sense. The si~n is de-
termined through previous experience of its object by the 
interpreter. 
The person who interprets ••• any ••• sign 
whatso ·ever must be determined by the object of it through 
collateral observation quite independently of the sign. 
Otherwise he would not be determined to thought of that 
object. (8.178) 
Now in our example of the tiger, even though the 
tracks may have been made by two different animals, to the 
· hunter both tracks are ·tiger tracks. The sign for him is 
the same and the context is the same regardless of the source 
of the sign, therefore the object is for him the same in 
both instances. The immediate object is that concept or 
idea of a tiger in the nearby surroundings. The dynamical 
object is the tiger(s) or knowledge of tiger(s) which, by · · 
collateral experience of them, determines the huriter to the 
thought of "tiger(s) in the nearby surroundings". The dy .. 
namical object is not the specifid tiger that is in the near-
by surroundings but the 0tiger(s) in the nearby surroundings" 
of collateral experience. 
On this interpretation the immediate object may be 
difficult to distinguish from the interpretant. And this 
type of analysis may be close to Greenlee•s claim that the 
interpretant is what is referred to in many sign situations. 30 
But I think this interpretation is more along the lines of 
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what Peirce intended when he spoke of objects. It does not 
eliminate a dynamical object from the sign situation as does 
Greenlee's analysis, and I think the dynamical object can 
not be eliminated. And it certainly does not eliminate the 
immediate object. 
I must admit, however, that we are still left with 
a thorny problem in our example of the tiger. The above 
analysis of this sign situation has left out the actual 
tiger who really made the track in the first instance (not 
to mention the other actual animal who made the blurred 
track in the second instance). That is, he is not the ob-
ject (dynamical or immediate) of the sign. He can not be 
the dynamical object becau~e there is no collateral ex-
perience of this particular tiger by the hunter, and he can 
not be the immediate object because the immediate object is 
an idea not a particular individual. The problem is that 
it seems quite natural to say that the object of the foot-
print is the actual tiger who made the footprint. Wouldn't 
this be an excellent example of an indexical sign, with a 
real connection with its object? But I think that to say 
this is to transcend the sign situation as the hunter ex-
periences it, and in doing this we change the context of the 
sign and so its object. I do not think it is implausible 
to say that the actual tiger is not the object of the track-
sign from the hunter's perspective. Certainly the hunter 
knows that if the track was made by an actual tiger thon 
there must be an actual tiger in the nearby surroundings, 
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but this is not to say that, that actual tiger is the ob-
ject of the track-sign. I think it is more proper to say 
that .the object is the general concept of an actual tiger 
in the nearby surroundings. 
When we change the situation and transcend it by 
saying ~hat in one instance an actual tige~ made the track 
and in the other actual animal (not a tiger) made the track 
mistaken asa tiger track, we have essentially assumed a 
collateral experi~nce of the actual objects and so they be-
come the dynamical objects which are dete ·rmining us to 
thought ·of these objects. (8.178) The hunter has no such 
experience and so both signs, being tokens of one type to 
· him, have the same dynamical and immediate objects al though . 
this in no way changes the reality of the connection between 
the signs and actual objects which produced them. If he 
were to find after further tracking that it was an unusually 
heavy fox which made the blurred track which he mistook for . 
a tiger track, then this fox would become the object of the 
track-sign, because the sign situation has now been changed 
by this new collateral information. 
At this pciint we come to the distinction between 
the intended object and meaning of a sign, and the inter-
preted object and meaning of a Sign. The reason for this 
discrepancy is precisely the difference in the context of 
the sign for the sign user or utterer and the sign inter-
preter. The object intended and the object interpreted are 
often just not the same. This is because signs are f_unctional 
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entities and how they function depends greatly on the con• 
text of the sign and this context is to some exten~ always 
dependent on the Lnterpreter or utterer. 
I would now like to enter a brief discussion of a 
question which is much debated. I stated earlier that 
everything can function as a sign but not everything is a 
sign. There is much dispute on this issue. The question 
relates to our discussion of the immediate and dynamic ob-
ject and to the general question of the object of signs. 
I believe that the immediate-dynamic distinction of objects 
may be helpful in resolving the issue although I doubt it 
will resolve it completely. 
While there are many passages which suggest that 
· Peirce may · have held that everything is ·a sign, he nowhere 
makes an explicit statement to this effect, at least not to 
.my knowledge. · For instance in 1.339 Peirce says that the 
object of a represent~tion is nothing but a representation · 
of which the first representation is , the interpretant~ This, 
according to Peirce, leads to an infinite regress of objects 
which are themselves representations of a former object. 
In 1.538 (1903) Peirce says that every sign stands for an 
object independent of itself but that it can only be a sign 
of that objec .t insofar as that object is itself of the nature 
of a thought or of a sign. Peirce even speaks of man as 
· being _nothing more than a sign. (5.251) 31 And in 7.408 fn. 19, 
Peirce says, "James wants us to say 'things'. I reply that 
•i~eas' were always meant as objects, diredt objects, not 
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matters of psychology, by those who talked of them." Ideas 
are ~f course, signs. Passag~i such as these . might lead 
one to ~uspect that Peirce felt everything is a sign. If 
th~ object of every representation is itself of the nature 
of a representation, idea or sign and if even man is nothing 
more than the word or sign man uses, then it .must seem that 
indeed everything is a sign. This is something like the 
approach of .Fairbanks in "Peirce on Man as a Language: A 
. . . 32 
Te~tual Interpretation". Ransdell argues that for Peirce 
· everything is a sign in "Another Interpretation of Peirce's . 
Semiotic". He believes that for Peirce there is nothing in 
the world and nothing thinkable at all which does not in-
corporate the relational structure of intelligibility which 
is the structure of the sign relation. Brock takes a sim-
ilar point of view in his "Draft of a Critique of Greenlee's 
Peirce's Concept of a Sign".33 
But even in the passages mentioned above Peirce 
leaves some doubt. In 1.339 he says that the endless series 
of representation as objects may be conceived as having an 
absolute object at its limits. And in 7.408 fn. 19 he talks 
of the rireal external things" eventhough he says they are 
beyond the power of thought. 
I would like to suggest that in these passages and 
others like them, Peirce is referring to the immediate ob-
ject. If this is the case, then there is no need to conclude 
that everything is a sign. Every sign has an immediate ob-
ject and the immediate object is of the nature of an idea 
60 
and therefore it is a sign. So although everything has a 
sign as its object it may only be as the - immediate obje .ct. 
This leaves the possibility that the dynamic object may 
be of a different nature although it, too, may be a sign. 
That we must leave room for things other than signs 
·. seems clear from Peirce's categorial division. Peirce in-
sists on dividing things ontologically according to whether 
they are firsts, seconds or thirds. Now signs are ~ssigned 
. only to the cat~gory of thirdness. And although there may 
be degenerate forms of thirdne ·ss, they are first or seconds 
of thirdness and are not in the categories of firstness or 
secondness. So there are things thinkable which are not 
thirds and therefbre not signs. It is one thing to say that 
all thought is in signs, which Peirce clearly held. It is 
quite another thing to say that everything thought about is 
a sign,which it is not at all clear Peirce held. 
CONCLUSION 
This study of Peirce's semiotic theory has concen~ 
. trated on two main questions. They are the questions of · 
the 6onventionality and intentionality of signs. On the 
question of conventionality I have tried to show that every 
sign is to some extent conventional. By this I mean that 
. some designation must be made by some intelligence that 
such and such will ~ignify such and such. It is quite true . 
that there are many things which are easily designated as 
signs for other things because of some real physical con-
nection · between them, or some natural resemblance or sim-
ilarity between them. But these connections do not ad-
equately constitute a sign situation. In such cases a men-
tal separation of options is required and a decision must 
be made as to what will constitute the ground of the sign 
and what eiactly it will refer to among th~ options available. 
That which separates signs from non-signs is the power to 
point to or refer to an object. Anything may function as 
a sign but it will not be able to function as a sign until 
it acquires the power to refer - to ~n object. A sign before 
it acquires the power ~an become a sign of anything. The 
convention ·designates the range of -a sign when it makes the 
mental connection between sign and object. · This is why a 
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convention is required for signification. I t~ied to show 
that in an iconic sign relation a convention is . required 
in order to specify what characteristics were to be regard-
ed as significant. · Iri an indexical sign situation I tried 
to show that a convention is required in order to restrict 
the range of potential objects since there usually is more 
than one physical connection between the sign in question 
and objects in the world. In .all cases an intel _lect . must 
p~rceive the physical connection and then decide that one 
of the two . connected events will b~ a sign of the other.34 
On the question of intentionality I argued, as 
Peirce did, that every sign indeed has an object but only 
when it actually functions as a sign. In this regard I laid 
much emphasis on context in the theory of sign. Here I 
tried to point out that it is not difficult to identify the 
object of a sign when the sign is actually functioning, and 
that signs really have no object until they are in an ac- · 
tually functioning sign situation. ,, 
It is at this point that sign theory seems to be 
the most complex. When Peirce discusses objects of specific 
signs he most often uses propositions as examples. These 
are complex s_igns in that they are made up of various in-
dividual signs starting with . the smallest mark on a piece 
of paper and moving through letters, words, phrases and 
clauses. Ev~ry sign is in a similar situation, that is, 
every sign is found in a context of other signs and that 
context is essential in determining the object of a given 
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sign. A sign-vehicle usually if not always, has more tl1an 
one potential object within the range of objects specified 
by the conventions concerning that sign-vehicle, and it is 
the context of a sign which determines the specific . range. 
This is why we must wait until a sign is actually function-
ing in order to determine its specific object and this is 
also why, as Peirce says, a sign may have any number of 
objects. (2.232) 
But there are still some questions about the con-
ventionality and intentionality of signs which may be worthy 
of some investigation. For one, we may wonder if at least 
actual objects of secondness are signs which require no con-
vention since when they are perceived they produce a thought, 
and since every thought is a sign. They produce this thought 
without a convention. Are not actual objects that are cap-
able of being perceived therefore signs since they are cap-
able of producing an interpretant in the form of a though- · 
sign? It may be that these are examples of signs which re-
quire no convention. But the problem is that they do not 
refer to any object, unless one wants to posit a thing-in-
itself. And for Peirce a sign must refer to an object in 
order to be a sign. It seems that the production of thought-
signs by actual objects, if this is indeed what is involved 
in perception, is a dyadic relation and therefore not a 
sign situation. 
At this point we can see a connection between the 
intentionality and conventionality of signs. If, as Greenlee 
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argues, we redefine the sign situation to require only an 
interpretant (i.e. to omit the requirement of intentionality) 
then actual objects that are capable of being perceived would 
have to be considered to be both signs, and signs requiring 
no convention. Thus it may be that Greenlee's non-intentional 
definition of signs and his requirement of conventionality 
are incompatible. , 
Another consequence of the conventional nature of 
signs is the necessary generality it brings to signs. 
Peirce has placed signs in the category of thirdness which 
is the category of generals. Thought, too, according to 
Peirce is general. It is the conventions of thought which 
extend the power to refer to objects and the power to deter-
mine interpretants to ''things". This is a necessary condi~ 
tion in making these "things" signs. And it is this con-
vention of thought which gives the sign its essential gen-
erality. 
This thesis has concentrated ~on an interpretation 
of Peirce's semiotic in regard to conventionality and inten-
tionality, but there are of course many other relevant 
issues in regard to these question, which will require much 
further study. For instance, can semiotics be naturalized 
and fit into a behavioral theory of psychology? Do we 
necessarily hypostatize certain non-real entities by making 
them the objects of signs? If signs are at least to some 
degree conventional and mind dependent and if all thought 
is in signs, how much objectivity can there be in communica-
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tion about the world? Just what is the relation between 
the "real world" (if there is one) and our signs concern-
ing it and what do we count as knowledge of it~ Can a single 
definition account for all kinds of signs or must ~e develop 
a theory of signs which associates signs through various 
family resemblances? If semiotic theory is a theory of 
meaning can it account for all kinds of meaning such as the 
meaning of life or the meaning of an abstract painting or 
an emotional piece ·of music? 
These are some of the broader questions all of which 
. require much difficult work. But there is also a maze of 
narrower technical questions of detail which constantly crop 
up in semiotic discussion. Many of these may have to be 
tackled before we can advance to the broader questions. I 
have attempted a start on two of the more important problems 
by using Peirce and to a lesser degree Greenlee, to bring 
them under scrutiny. There is much room for discussion 
and refinement. 
NOTES 
1 I am putting aside the question of self reference. Al-
though it is an interesting point, whether or not there are 
signs which refer to themselves fully as their complete ob-
ject won't effect the answer to the question of whether all 
signs have an obj~ct. If there are such self referential 
signs, we would simply say that they have themselves a~ ob-
jects. 
2 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), p. 37. 
3 I have not discussed the various degenerate forms of the 
caregories. For instance, thirdness has a firstness of 
thirdness and a secondness of thirdness which can also be 
further divided into degenerate cases of these subcategories. 
Again, although interesting, this is not essential to a dis-
cussion of Peirce's semiotic. For a more detailed discussion 
see 1.284-1.353 ·and 1.417-1.530. 
4 Greenlee makes much of thia distinction and feels that 
it is the source of some confusion on the part of Peirce. 
He argues that Peirce was not always aware of this distinc-
tion himself and at times this lead him astray in his con-
clusions about signs. See Douglas Greenlee's Peirce's 
Concept of Si~n (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1973), pp. 8-~, -
40-42, 134-13 and Sec. III, Chap. 2. Also "Peirce's 
Hypostatic and Factorial Categories" ' by Douglas Greenlee, 
Transactions of the Charles s. Peirce Society IV (1968), 
PP• 49-50. 
5 For a detailed discussion of the 66 classes see "On 
Peirce's 66 Signs" by Gary Sanders, Transaction of the 
Charles s. Peirce Society VI (1970J, pp. 3-16. 
6 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), p. 43. 
7 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), PP• 133-137. 
8 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), pp. 70-84. 
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9 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), P• 77. 
10 Mental association may also be construed as determina-
tion by a law of nature. This type of interpretation would 
be indicative of the attempt of many to maturalize the sign 
structure and integrate it with behaviorist psychology. 
11 I realize that there are many who would deny that not 
everything is a sign, and perhaps even Peirce held this. 
I will deal briefly with this issue toward the end of the 
thesis (pp. 57-59). 
12 The reason this is not a sign situation is that it is 
a simple cause effect ~elation and so can not be a sign 
situation, since the sign is a triadic rather than dyadic 
relation. This is not to say that there are no physical 
interpretarits. Certainly there are. · 
67 
13 One is tempted also to bring out the parallels between 
the essential intentiality of thought and the basic relation-
of sign to object or basic intentionality of signs. (5.253 
in Peirce) Like Brentano, for Peirce, thought is always 
thought of something. This follows from the doctrine that 
a sign is always a sign of something. 
14 Much of the following has been taken from Greenlee's 
discussion of the Index in Peirce's Concept of Sign (The 
Hague: Mouton & Co., 1973), pp. 84-93. · He gives a lucid 
explaination of the index and demonstrates its dependence 
on a convention. 
15 Thomas Goudge also notes this type of deterioration in · 
his article "Peirce's Index", Transactions of the Charles 
s. Peirce Society I (1965) pp. 52-70. He also notes some 
other problems with Peirce's Index and Symbol. 
16 This is the ground of an object which we discussed 
earlier. The sign stands for its object not in all respects 
but in reference to a sort of idea which Peirce sometimes 
calls a ground. (2.228) 
17 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), p. 89. 
18 Ex. The word "man""is a general mode of succession of 
three sounds or representamens of sounds, which becomes a 
sign only in the fact that a habit, or acquired law, will 
cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or 
men." (2.292) 
19 Fitzgerald makes this point well using Icon, Index and 
Symbol, but it may be made within the division of Rheme, 
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Dicisign and Argument. · 
20 Peirce. Also John J. Fitzgerald, 
Foundation for matism (The 
2, and 
21 John J. Fitzgerald, Peirce's Th~or 
tion for Pragmatism (The~H~a_g_u_e_:~M~o-u·t-:-on-.-::--;;--~~-~,--p-.~~ 
22 This interpretation of the emotional, energetic and 
logical interpretants as subdivisions of the dyna~ical 
interpretant ~s dev~loped by Fitzgerald in Peirce's Theory 
of Sins as F~undation for Pra matism (The Hague: Mouton & 
Co., 19 , pp. 7 -90. It differs from Weiss and Burk, Goudge, 
Buchler and Feibleman who identify the emotional, ertergetiQ 
. and logical interpr _etant with the immediate, dynamic and 
final interpretant respe~tively. Fitzgerald's interpretation 
seems to be the better one. It distinguishes between the 
ultimate logical interpretant and the final interpretant 
_which do seem to be different in Peirce • . 
23 The reason I say the logical interpretant may end in an 
ultimate logical interpretant is that for Peirce not every 
sign c6ntinues its progression to its lbgical completion. 
In 2.303 he ~ays, "If the series of successive interpretants 
comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect at 
least." The interpretant chain may be broken off by a dis-
traction or a person may not exert the necassary mental 
effort to develop an ultimate logical interpretant and develop 
a habit. Some signs may only have energetic or emotional 
interpretarits so that the progression toward an ultimate 
logical interpretant may not sven get started. 
24 This does not necessarily imply physical reaction. It 
may only be~ mental reaction. · 
25 Fo~ a complete discussion of this 
Fitzgerald' .s Peirce's Theor 
Pragmatism (The Hague: Mouton 
and . VIII. 
IV 
26 Peirce in 1.542 says that the triadic sign relation must 
"consist in a power -of the representamen to determine some 
interpr .etant to being a representamen of the same object." 
27 It may seem that I am stretching . the meaning of "object" 
here, but I don't think it is implausible to answer the ques-
tion, "What does 'P' refer to?", by saying that by itself, 
as · a letter in isolation, its only reference may be the 
package of rule~ about how "P" may function. This is 6ne 
oi' the objects to which "P" may potentially refer. And in 
the context described above it does not seem to stretch the 
meaning of "object" as I take it or as I think Peirce tak$s 
it. 
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28 Let me stress here that I do not intend to say that 
there are not some things that by their · close physical 
connection or their characteristic resemblance to Borne ob-
ject are more likely to become signs of that object. I 
. only mean that they can not bec~me significative of that 
object unless there is some designation by a mind that that 
thing shall be a sign of that object. 
29 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce's Concept of Sign (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co., 1973), pp. 67-68. 
30 Ransdell make~ a similar point to the effect that the 
sign relation Greenlee describes may. not be much different 
from Peirce's in Ransdell's artible "Another Interpretatiori 
of . Peirce's Semiotic~' Transactions or · the · Charles s. Peirce 
Society XII (1976), pp. 97-110. He also argues for the 
necessity of, at least, the immediate object, but rejects 
. the idea of a "real object" because "there is semiosis 
whi _ch does not concern itself with reality." This of course, 
is true ~ccording to Peirce, but Peirce does not identify 
the real object with the dynamical object (see 8.314), and 
Ransd~ll fails to make thii . distinction himself in the body 
of his paper. Instead, he seems to id~ntify the real and 
dynamical object and then dismisses them with the above off-
·hand remark. 
31 See Matthew J. Fairbanks' article on this subject; "Peirce 
-0n Man as a Language: A Textual Interpr~tation'', Tpansactions 
of the Charles s. Peirce Society XII (1976), pp. 18-32. · 
· 32 ''Peirce on Min as a Language: A Textual Interpretation" 
by Matthew J. Fairbanks in Tran~actions of the Charles s. 
Peirce Society XII (1976), pp. 18-32. 
33 "Another Interpretation of Peirce's Semiotic" by Joseph 
Ransdell in Transactions of the Charles s. Peirce Society 
XII (1976), pp. 97-110 . and "Draft of a Critique of Greenlee's 
Peirce's Concept of Sign by Jarrett E. Brock in Transactions 
of the Charles s. Peirce Society XII (1976), pp. 111-126. 
34 Whether or not such a decision is forced on the intellect 
once . the connection is perceived may be an interesting and 
pertinent topic of investigation. 
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